

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JENNIFER TURNER, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

QUINSTREET, INC. d/b/a Schools.com, a
Delaware corporation,

Defendant.

No. C 18-01486 WHA

**NOTICE AND ORDER RE
FACTORS TO BE EVALUATED
FOR ANY PROPOSED
CLASS SETTLEMENT**

For the guidance of counsel, please review the *Procedural Guidance for Class Action Settlements*, which is available on the website for the United States District Court for the Northern District of California at www.cand.uscourts.gov/ClassActionSettlementGuidance.

In addition, counsel should review the following substantive and timing factors that the undersigned judge will consider in determining whether to grant preliminary and/or final approval to a proposed class settlement. Many of these factors have already been set forth in *In re Bluetooth Headset Products Liability Litigation*, 654 F.3d 935, 946–47 (9th Cir. 2011), but the following discussion further illustrates the undersigned judge’s consideration of such factors:

1. ADEQUACY OF REPRESENTATION.

Anyone seeking to represent a class, including a settlement class, must affirmatively meet the Rule 23 standards, including adequacy. It will not be enough for a defendant to stipulate to adequacy of the class representation (because a defendant cannot speak for absent class

1 members). An affirmative showing of adequacy must be made in a sworn record. Any possible
2 shortcomings in a plaintiff's resume, such as a conflict of interest, a criminal conviction, a prior
3 history of litigiousness, and/or a prior history with counsel, must be disclosed. Adequacy of
4 counsel is not a substitute for adequacy of the representative.

5 **2. DUE DILIGENCE.**

6 Please remember that when one undertakes to act as a fiduciary on behalf of others (here,
7 the absent class members), one must perform adequate due diligence before acting. This
8 requires the representative and his or her counsel to investigate the strengths and weaknesses of
9 the case, including the best-case dollar amount of claim relief. A quick deal up front may not be
10 fair to absent class members.

11 **3. COST-BENEFIT FOR ABSENT CLASS MEMBERS.**

12 In the proposed class settlement, how do the costs of what absent class members will give
13 up compare to the benefits of what they will receive in exchange? If the recovery will be a full
14 recovery, then much less will be required to justify the settlement than for a partial recovery, in
15 which case the discount will have to be justified. The greater the discount, the greater must be
16 the justification. This will require an analysis of the specific proof, such as a synopsis of any
17 conflicting evidence on key fact points. It will also require a final class-wide damage study or a
18 very good substitute, in sworn form. If little discovery has been done to see how strong the
19 claim is, it will be hard to justify a substantial discount on the mere generalized theory of "risks
20 of litigation." A coupon settlement will rarely be approved. Where there are various subgroups
21 within the class, counsel must justify the plan of allocation of the settlement fund.

22 **4. THE RELEASE.**

23 The proposed release should be limited only to the claims certified for class treatment.
24 Language releasing claims that "could have been brought" is too vague and overbroad. The
25 specific statutory or common law claims to be released should be spelled out. Class counsel
26 must justify the release as to each claim released, the probability of winning, and its estimated
27 value if fully successful.
28

1 Does the proposed class settlement contemplate that claims of absent class members will
2 be released even for those whose class notice is returned as undeliverable? Usually, the Court
3 will *not* extinguish claims of individuals known to have received no notice or who received no
4 benefit (and/or for whom there is no way to send them a settlement check). Put differently,
5 usually the release must extend only to those who receive money for the release.

6 **5. EXPANSION OF THE CLASS.**

7 Typically, defendants vigorously oppose class certification and/or argue for a narrow
8 class. In settling, however, defendants often seek to expand the class, either geographically
9 (*i.e.*, nationwide) or claim-wise (including claims not even in the complaint) or person-wise
10 (*e.g.*, multiple new categories). Such expansions will be viewed with suspicion. If an expansion
11 is to occur it must come with an adequate plaintiff and one with standing to represent the add-on
12 scope and with an amended complaint to include the new claims, not to mention due diligence as
13 to the expanded scope. The settlement dollars must be sufficient to cover the old scope plus the
14 new scope. Personal and subject-matter jurisdiction over the new individuals to be compromised
15 by the class judgment must be shown.

16 **6. REVERSION.**

17 A proposed class settlement that allows for a reversion of settlement funds to the
18 defendant(s) is a red flag, for it runs the risk of an illusory settlement, especially when combined
19 with a requirement to submit claims that may lead to a shortfall in claim submissions.

20 **7. CLAIM PROCEDURE.**

21 A settlement that imposes a claim procedure rather than cutting checks to class members
22 for the appropriate amount may (or may not) impose too much of a burden on class members,
23 especially if the claim procedure is onerous, or the period for submitting is too short, or there is a
24 likelihood of class members treating the notice envelope as junk mail. The best approach, when
25 feasible, is to calculate settlement checks from a defendant's records (plus due diligence
26 performed by counsel) and to send the checks to the class members along with a notice that
27 cashing the checks will be deemed acceptance of the release and all other terms of the
28 settlement.

1 **8. ATTORNEY’S FEES.**

2 To avoid collusive settlements, the Court prefers that all settlements avoid any agreement
3 as to attorney’s fees and leave that to the judge. If the defense insists on an overall cap, then
4 the Court will decide how much will go to the class and how much will go to counsel, just
5 as in common fund cases. Please avoid agreement on any division, tentative or otherwise.
6 A settlement whereby the attorney seems likely to obtain funds out of proportion to the benefit
7 conferred on the class must be justified.

8 **9. DWINDLING OR MINIMAL ASSETS?**

9 If the defendant is broke or nearly so with no prospect of future rehabilitation, a steeper
10 discount may be warranted. This must be proven. Counsel should normally verify a claim of
11 poverty via a sworn record, thoroughly vetted.

12 **10. TIMING OF PROPOSED SETTLEMENT.**

13 The parties shall not discuss settlement as to any class claims prior to class certification.
14 To elaborate, when a class settlement is proposed prior to formal class certification, there is a
15 risk that class claims have been discounted, at least in part, by the risk that class certification
16 might be denied. Absent class members, of course, should be subject to normal discounts for
17 risks of litigation on the merits but they should not be subject to a further discount for a risk of
18 denial of class certification, such as, for example, a denial based on problems with a proposed
19 class representative, including a conflict of interest or a prior criminal conviction. *See* Howard
20 Erichson, *Beware The Settlement Class Action*, DAILY JOURNAL (Nov. 24, 2014). This is a main
21 reason the Court prefers to litigate and vet a class certification motion *before* any class
22 settlement discussions take place. That way, the class certification is a done deal and cannot
23 compromise class claims. Only the risks of litigation on the merits can do so.

24 In order to have a better record to evaluate the foregoing considerations, it is better to
25 develop and to present a proposed compromise *after* class certification, *after* diligent discovery
26 on the merits, and *after* the damage study has been finalized. On the other hand, there will be
27 some cases in which it will be acceptable to conserve resources and to propose a resolution
28 sooner. For example, if the proposal will provide full recovery (or very close to full recovery)

1 then there is little need for more due diligence. The poorer the settlement, however, the more
2 justification will be needed and that usually translates to *more* discovery and *more* due diligence;
3 otherwise, it is best to let absent class members keep their own claims and fend for themselves
4 rather than foist a poor settlement on them. Particularly when counsel propose to compromise
5 the potential claims of absent class members in a low-percentage recovery, the Court will insist
6 on a detailed explanation of why the case has turned so weak, an explanation that usually must
7 flow from discovery and due diligence, not merely generalized “risks of litigation.” Counsel
8 should remember that merely filing a putative class complaint does not authorize them to
9 extinguish the rights of absent class members. *If counsel believe settlement discussions should*
10 *precede a class certification, a motion for appointment of interim class counsel must first*
11 *be made.* “[S]ettlement approval that takes place prior to formal class certification requires a
12 higher standard of fairness.” *Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.*, 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998).

13 **11. A RIGHT TO OPT OUT IS NOT A CURE-ALL.**

14 A borderline settlement proposal cannot be justified merely because absent class
15 members may opt out if they wish. The Court has (and counsel have) an independent, stand-
16 alone duty to assess whether the proposed class settlement is reasonable and adequate. Once the
17 named parties reach a settlement in a purported class action, they are always solidly in favor of
18 their own proposal. There is no advocate to critique the proposal on behalf of absent class
19 members. That is one reason that Rule 23(e) insists that the district court vet all
20 class settlements.

21 **12. INCENTIVE PAYMENT.**

22 If the proposed class settlement by itself is not good enough for the named plaintiff, why
23 should it be good enough for absent class members similarly situated? Class litigation proceeded
24 well for many decades before the advent of requests for “incentive payments,” which too
25 often are simply ways to make a collusive or poor settlement palatable to the named plaintiff.
26 A request for an incentive payment is a red flag.

